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1Keys to Unblocking Multilateral Nuclear Arms Control
Clifford E. Singer and Amy Sands
Given the current U.S. government’s resistance to formalized, negotiated multilateral treaties, success in the
area of multilateral nuclear arms control over the next decade will present a challenge. To make any progress in
the first half of this decade so that substantial results may occur in the second half, creative alternatives to
immediate treaty negotiations will be necessary. This article outlines in the context of one multilateral arms
control effort, namely the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), what activities must be undertaken and issues
addressed if efforts to develop more effective multilateral nuclear arms control are to resume and eventually
succeed.
We point out that an eventual universal halt to production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons programs
is inevitable, but the timing of this is as yet very uncertain. We examine the impasse in the Geneva Conference
on Disarmament (CD) over whether discussions or negotiations on prevention of an arms race in outer space
(PAROS) will accompany FMCT negotiations and discussions of the overall future of nuclear disarmament.
The linkages between these three arms control efforts are central to our discussion concerning the future of
multilateral arms control and ways to unblock the current impasse. Understanding the dynamic between
PAROS, FMCT, and disarmament discussions at the CD requires examining each of these areas and their
linkages to one another. For example, to better gauge the reasons behind China’s insistence on simultaneous
PAROS and FMCT negotiations, we analyze Chinese positions on PAROS and FMCT, including the
implications of a recent joint Chinese and Russian proposal on PAROS. Because it is formally compatible with
U.S. pursuit of missile defense programs as long as they do not explicitly threaten or attack other countries
orbiting satellites or other space assets, this new proposal provides a potential starting point for a compromise
between previously incompatible U.S. and Chinese positions in the CD. However, there is still a need to resolve
a disagreement on whether it is clear a priori that a new treaty on military uses of outer space is needed. We
conclude by discussing three options that may evolve to become the most viable for dealing with PAROS in the
CD: 1) demilitarizing the international space station by treaty, 2) clarifying the scope of the Outer Space Treaty
for the whole of outer space and 3) pursuing an agreement primarily aimed at further restricting military
activities beyond geosynchronous orbit.
We also examine the question of discussions in the CD on the future of nuclear disarmament, and their
relationship to the question of whether PAROS and the FMCT will proceed in a negotiation or discussion
format. We do this because some states have linked the initiation of any movement on PAROS, FMCT, and
nuclear disarmament at the CD to certain characteristics of these efforts, such as whether they all proceed in
discussion or negotiation format.
We conclude by returning to the FMCT, and then looking beyond the CD context. The focus of this
discussion is on the impact of the “war on terrorism,” the most recent confrontation between India and Pakistan,
and the continuing strife over Palestine on the timing of the establishment of a broader moratorium on the
production of additional fissile materials for nuclear weapons programs. Recent events have opened up possible
new opportunities for achieving such a broader moratorium within a decade. However, they also present new
challenges that may prevent this outcome if the opportunity and challenge it presents is not artfully engaged.
The FMCT In Today’s Context
Eventually each of the countries with nuclear weapons capabilities will accumulate as much unsafeguarded
nuclear weapons plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) as it is going to want for the foreseeable future.
When all states reach this point, let’s call it “Point B,” there will be a de facto universal moratorium on the
production of such material. The moratorium may last indefinitely, or until such time as some state starts
making unsafeguarded weapons material. However, we are now at a “Point A” where negotiations on a fissile
materials production cut-off treaty (FMCT) are stalled at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament.
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Determining and pursuing the most expeditious path between this “A” and “B” could be important for two
reasons. First, a production cut-off would signal and possibly help cement achievement of a certain degree of
stability in relationships involving countries that had formerly been producing plutonium or separating uranium
isotopes for weapons programs. Second, a transparent production moratorium is a necessary prerequisite for an
effective comprehensive and global management system for nuclear materials and weapons. Here
comprehensive global nuclear management is taken to mean that all nuclear weapons material is kept in a
defined set of locations under the secure control of national command authorities in a well-defined set of states.
For nuclear weapons materials in fixed locations, comprehensive management requires a secure set of
protection, control, and accounting procedures.1 For mobile launcher locations, comprehensive management
implies precise nuclear inventory control for weapons in transit and tight security against possible efforts to
commandeer or divert nuclear weapons to outside the control of the national command authority. At the
minimum, the host country should be justified in having complete confidence in the adequacy of these
management procedures. Ideally, there would be sufficient transparency on quality control and declarations of
any nuclear material stocks declarations that other interested countries would also have a similar degree of
confidence.
A traditional reason for increasing transparency and quality of comprehensive nuclear management is to
assure other countries against the possibility of hidden threats that go beyond declared or readily apparent
capabilities. A growing recent concern is to build confidence that nuclear weapons materials will not be
diverted into the hands of non-state actors outside of the secure control of the national command authority,
whatever country these actors might be from. It is highly unlikely that all of the relevant nations will be willing
to accommodate the transparency needed for comprehensive and transparent global nuclear management if they
have not previously agreed to the less intrusive and restrictive transparency needed for a global cutoff of the
production of unsafeguarded fissile materials. For this reason, a cut-off in the production of additional fissile
materials for nuclear weapons programs appears to be a prerequisite for attaining the broader goal of
comprehensive global nuclear management in the sense used here.
FMCT negotiation was one of the steps agreed to in connection with the indefinite extension of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1995. States not party to the NPT had also agreed to the start of FMCT
negotiations in 1998, albeit with some reservations. In addition to detailed implementation procedures involving
issues such as transparency and verification, outstanding issues deal with existing stocks of fissile materials and
with the possible future production of naval reactor fuel highly enriched in the isotope uranium-235. The
question of existing stocks may be resolved by inviting but not requiring states to declare additional fissile
materials excess to nuclear weapons programs and developing appropriate procedures for safeguards and
transparency.2 For naval propulsion, a possible solution is for concerned states to make ratification of an FMCT
contingent on adequate verification that new HEU production isn’t being used for nuclear weapons.
However, the process of working out details concerning transparency, verification, existing stocks, and
possible future uranium enrichment for naval propulsion has been stalled since 1998 due to disagreements on
the overall agenda for the CD. In particular, negotiations on an FMCT in Geneva are currently coupled with
prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS) and with discussions in an ad hoc working group on nuclear
disarmament. China, for example, is resisting FMCT discussions until its concerns about PAROS are addressed.
It is insisting on negotiations on PAROS, while the United States will consider only discussions. Previously this
was with the understanding that discussions would lead to negotiations. However, at the CD on 27 June 2002,
the U.S. ambassador supported the idea of an Ad Hoc Committee on PAROS but said that the United States
cannot accept the idea that it should “start its work with the preconceived idea that it will later be necessary to
negotiate a legally binding agreement.”3 What is the likelihood that issues relating to PAROS and nuclear
disarmament may be addressed so that the FMCT negotiation can get under way?
PAROS
The deadlock in the CD from the halt of FMCT negotiations in 1998 through May of 2002 was not merely
semantic or procedural. It reflected Chinese concerns about U.S. long term plans for space and ballistic missile
defenses. China was unwilling to negotiate a cap on its own fissile materials production as long as it faced the
prospect of an unlimited offensive/defensive strategic nuclear arms competition with the United States, which
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would involve at least include space-based support systems. The current U.S. president had indirectly attempted
to reassure China that U.S. ballistic missile defenses are not aimed at undermining the credibility of China’s
nuclear first strike capability. However, the Chinese appeared to be unconvinced.4 The Chinese seem to have
complete confidence that China can and would readily maintain deterrent capability in the presence of any
missile defenses that the United States deploys. As a result, from the Chinese perspective there remained the
possibility of an open-ended offensive-defensive nuclear arms race that would preclude a negotiated agreement
on a fissile materials production cut-off because of the United States’ unwillingness to define its long term plans
for its ballistic missile defenses. American opacity about the ultimate configuration of its ballistic missile
defenses and the role of space-based assets therein did not bode well for creating confidence within China,
which was suspicious of American intent being domination to the detriment of Chinese national security. That
this dynamic between possible American missile defenses (including their use of space) and the possible
Chinese need for additional fissile materials to address those capabilities was the formal logic of the impasse on
FMCT negotiations is not widely understood.
China’s stated preference implied that there be no active use of outer space for military purposes, such as
positioning ground-strike and other weapons in outer space. This could even imply the banning of space-based
reconnaissance and communications for battle management, such as guidance of precision munitions. The idea
that Chinese soil and Chinese embassies should be inviolate from precision attack is deeply engrained, making
the foreign use of space above China for military purposes an anathema despite this already being a reality.
Some even concluded that incompatibility between Chinese and U.S. positions made the impasse on PAROS
and, thus on the FMCT, impossible to resolve.
However, the Chinese position on PAROS and FMCT can be seen as having several layers. Specifically, in
connection with PAROS, it is useful to distinguish between what is desired within China’s overall policy goals
and what is essential with respect to restarting FMCT negotiations. What is desired from a Chinese viewpoint is
preventing U.S. military domination of space, and what is essential is avoiding unlimited buildup of U.S.
ballistic missile defenses (or a significant influence on cross-straits relations from transfer of related theater
missile defense technology to Taiwan). Given appropriate signals from the leadership and the absence of
interfering factors (like last year’s airplane incident in Hainan), it was possible for China’s arms control experts
to identify a distinction between what is needed to get discussions moving and what the Chinese will actually
want to focus these discussion on once they begin. Given sufficient delay after complicating incidents like the
U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Serbia and the Hainan affair, it remained possible that China would
evolve a more pragmatic approach to making progress in the CD. What was necessary in the meantime was that
the United States continue to send adequate signals on Taiwan. A particularly sensitive issue is psychologically
relevant arms transfers to Taiwan, such as a complete Aegis naval defense system. The Bush administration did
indeed manage to “thread the needle” on this sensitive issue, setting the stage for a new Chinese initiative for
the CD.
A somewhat more pragmatic approach was indeed forthcoming when China made public a draft of a joint
working paper with Russia on PAROS on 10 June 2002.5 A presentation on this was made to the CD seventeen
days later. Some basic obligations in this proposal were “not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects
carrying any kind of weapons, not to install such weapons on celestial bodies, or not to station such weapons in
outer space in any other manner.” Additional proposed basic obligations were not to resort to the threat or use of
force against space objects. Missing from this proposal were obligations in a previous Chinese proposal not to
test in outer space “any weapons, weapons systems, or components,” and “not to test, deploy, or use on land, in
sea, or atmosphere any weapons, weapons systems, or their components that can be used for war-fighting in
outer space…”6 Unlike this previous Chinese proposal, the new joint proposal on PAROS is formally
compatible with the testing and deployment of exo-atmospheric missile interceptors with their inevitable anti-
satellite capability. Under the new proposal such interceptors could in principle be deployed as long as this
involved no threat or use of force against outer space objects. This assumes, of course, that the suborbital
offensive missiles the interceptors are explicitly designed to threaten and destroy are not to be included in the
definition of “space objects.”
The joint proposal on PAROS from China and Russia removes a seemingly insuperable difficulty by no
longer being formally incompatible with U.S. missile defense plans. However, the suggestion that such proposal
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be discussed under a negotiating rather than discussion mandate is still incompatible with the above-mentioned
U.S. response on the question of negotiations vs. discussions.
The question thus remains how progress on PAROS in the CD might realistically be envisioned. This
question is examined here only in the context of placement of weapons systems in or beyond trajectories where
they orbit the Earth more than once. Productive discussion of universal controls on military reconnaissance or
communication or use of suborbital trajectories is assumed to be out of the question for the readily foreseeable
future because the U. S. intelligence community and Air Force would resist any attempt to negotiate substantive
limits on their ability to use or protect existing types of space assets. On such topics, it is unlikely that either the
U.S. administration or Congress would move to overrule its security establishment. For approaches to avoid this
pitfall and still permit meaningful PAROS discussions to occur, three options, each a confidence-building
measure with significance, will be explored here.
One option is to discuss ways to protect the international space station. The station will eventually be a
nearly $100 billion asset that is extraordinarily vulnerable to complete destruction by vertical launch of a single
low-cost precision sounding rocket. Should such an event occur it would provoke a profound crisis of an
urgency ill suited to measured debate over international legal precedent. Would such an attack be an Act of
War, and if so against whom? Would it constitute simple murder? If so, how would the responsibility be
apportioned along the perpetrators’ chain of command, and what would constitute broadly acceptable means for
bringing them to justice? A prior agreement on such matters could be valuable in itself. It could also provide a
broadly understandable precedent for extension to more subtle questions, such as the use and protection of
commercial communications satellites. However, in an exchange of letters with space station partners in 1998
the United States left open the possibility of use of the space station for security purposes.7 There is thus serious
doubt whether even a future U.S. administration would countenance the demilitarization of the space station by
international treaty.
A second option for eventual PAROS discussions concerns the meaning and implementation of the
agreement commonly known as the Outer Space Treaty. This treaty is somewhat ambiguous about just what it
prohibits, and it also omits specifics on verification mechanisms. In particular, while the Outer Space Treaty
prohibits the use of “celestial bodies” themselves for military purposes, it is mute on a question potentially more
relevant for the twenty-first century, namely whether military use of materials obtained from such bodies is
prohibited. Of particular potential interest is the use for rocket fuel of hydrogen obtained from earth-
approaching asteroids, or conceivably from the polar regions of the moon. By placing a mass launcher on the
moon or by throwing mass from one earth-approaching asteroid in the path of another, the energy cost of
bringing extraterrestrial material to earth orbit can be made much less than the energy cost of lifting the same
amount of mass from the earth. Given sufficient experience with manned and automated operations in space, it
is reasonably likely that the dollar cost of such extraterrestrial materials transfers will also become less than the
dollar cost of ground launch.8 As with the Antarctica treaty, it may be much easier to negotiate the
demilitarization of such activities decades before they become economically practical then when such
practicability is more imminent. While such issues may not seem pressing, they nevertheless have considerable
long-range significance, are potentially negotiable, and could build confidence in this arena for eventual formal
negotiations. However, promoting the peaceful uses of deep space is in the purview of the United Nations
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS). The COPUOS member states might be reluctant
either to have this committee left out of such a discussion or to have it tackle the complicated and distant issue
of the possible military implications of such advanced space technology.
A third possibility for eventual PAROS discussions concerns the possibility of banning all military
activities in outer space beyond geosynchronous orbit. While the Antarctica Treaty demilitarized a whole
continent, such an action would more boldly demilitarize the rest of the universe. This would require an
implementation mechanism, if only to deal with the question of misfires that might send military satellites much
beyond 40,000 kilometers from earth. Again, any implementation mechanisms could provide a precedent in the
unexpected event that a consensus developed on additional restrictions on military activities at lower altitude.
Of course these issues deal with remote potential threats compared to the kind of international crisis that could
be precipitated if a country withdrew from the Outer Space Treaty and put nuclear weapons in orbit. However,
it is precisely the less emotive nature of discussions of longer term issues that makes them potentially more
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manageable to address in the CD context, provided of course that there is a consensus on doing anything at all
concerning PAROS as part of breaking the overall impasse in the CD.
Nuclear Disarmament
For many years, India and several other states have pushed for the CD to have nuclear disarmament negotiations
or discussions. During that time, the United States, Russia, and other nuclear weapons states have opposed such
efforts. Finally in 2000 when even Russia, the final holdout, agreed to the idea of an ad hoc group discussing
nuclear disarmament at the CD, the possibility of such discussions became viable. It is important to realize that
there is already agreement that this third portion of the proposed nuclear-related CD agenda has a very different
function from that agreed upon for the FMCT and that proposed by China and Russia for PAROS. For it has
been understood from the start that the ad hoc working group on disarmament would have a discussion rather
than a negotiation mandate. Thus the immediate diplomatic problem is constructing an agenda for this working
group that will not get in the way of negotiations on the FMCT. This will be, nevertheless, a delicate task. A
discussion program that clearly has no chance of ever turning into a negotiating mandate may rankle nuclear
disarmament proponents, while a more realistic program with any substance may provoke opposition from
elements within nuclear weapons states that may want to avoid any possibility of discussions evolving into
substantive negotiations.
A 13–Step program agreed upon at the year 2000 Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference9 has
been envisioned as a possible basis for discussions on the future of nuclear arms control and disarmament. This
program calls for early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), a moratorium on
nuclear explosions, negotiation of an FMCT, discussions on nuclear disarmament in the CD, irreversibility of
nuclear disarmament, and an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapons states for the elimination of their
nuclear arsenals. It also recommends conclusion of a third strategic arms reduction treaty (START III) and
strengthening the antiballistic missile (ABM) treaty, as well as implementation of the US/Russia/IAEA
(International Atomic Energy Agency) Trilateral Initiative on surplus weapons program materials. In addition, it
calls for nuclear disarmament steps including unilateral reductions of strategic and non-strategic nuclear
weapons, increased transparency, de-alerting, and a diminishing role of nuclear weapons in security policies.
Finally, it identifies the need for international cooperation on disposition of excess weapons materials,
reaffirmation of the goal of general and complete disarmament, regular reporting on progress towards
disarmament, and improved verification. However, making the 13–Step program the basis for discussions in the
CD faces many difficulties, especially given the Bush Administration’s current negative view of the CTBT,
ABM Treaty, and most of the rest of that program’s agenda. A similar program, but without references to the
CTBT and ABM Treaty, might become acceptable to India, Pakistan, and Israel as a basis for discussions in the
CD, in part because the program itself does not call for these countries to sign the NPT. However, in negotiating
this maze, a particularly delicate issue may be finding a method acceptable to Japan and others to integrate the
concerns about the nuclear weapons capabilities of India, Pakistan, and Israel without explicitly acknowledging
them as “nuclear weapons states” as defined in the NPT.
One possible alternative approach to deal more broadly with the question of irreversible and universal
commitments to nuclear disarmament is through discussion of a declaration with the following features:
I. Limits on Possession of Nuclear Explosive Devices
1. Beginning on (    ) the number of nuclear explosive devices held by any country subscribing to this
Declaration will be no more than (    ).
2. Subject to the limitations under Article II of this Declaration, the limit on the number of nuclear
explosive devices held by any country subscribing to this Declaration [hereinafter, Adherent] shall be
reduced by a factor of (    ) at the end of every subsequent (    ) year period.
II. Exemptions from Lowered Limits
1. Any Adherent may exempt itself from a lowering of the limit on the number of nuclear explosive devices
it may possess by giving notice (    ) years in advance of the effective date of such lowered limit. This
notice shall include a statement of the reasons for its refusal to accept a lower limit.
2. The limit on the number of nuclear explosive devices held by any active Adherent shall not be increased.
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The idea here is to first agree on such an approach in principle. Discussion on the details of how the blanks
might be filled in could then follow. Then commitment to such declarations could be pursued in a parallel
unilateral fashion, presumably with provisions for orderly cancellation under extraordinary circumstances.
Alternatively, a call could be issued for such declarations to be deposited to an appropriate repository such as
the Secretary General of the United Nations.
In today’s context, it is probably most practicable to avoid treaties or discussions of treaties that rely on the
13-Step program specifically. Instead, the goals of this effort—such as a moratorium on nuclear testing,
lowering the numbers of nuclear weapons, and increasing transparencies—should be distilled and used as
guideposts. Such an approach could include additional limits on qualitative upgrades of nuclear arsenals (e.g.
through nuclear testing) and additional agreements on disposition of excess materials, on verification, and on
limiting production, possession, or means of delivery of nuclear weapons.10
Such an approach would have the virtue from an Indian point of view of being fully non-discriminatory, in
that its call for a universal upper limit on assembled nuclear explosives holdings applies equally to all states,
regardless of whether they have adopted a minimum deterrence policy, are building down to lower levels, have
opted for no nuclear weapons holdings, or are within the area of a nuclear weapons free zone. Such an approach
is only likely to be acceptable in face of at least a tacit understanding that China will not build up its arsenal to
the universal limit, with India possibly following suit. As noted above, however, such an understanding with
China is likely in any case to be necessary to break the PAROS deadlock. In this context it is possible, albeit far
from certain, that Japan and India could have a meeting of the minds on how to deal with NPT non-signatories
where India is included in international discussions. Otherwise some similar sort of “don’t ask; don’t tell”
approach to India’s nuclear role will be needed, with all of the delicate problems that this tack inevitably entails.
In the readily foreseeable future the U.S. Administration is unlikely to actively endorse such a broad
discussion of the overall future of nuclear weapons. The most that might be expected, and this probably only
after 2004, is that a U.S. president of either party might demur to having this included as one possible approach
to discussions, in the hope that more contentious and less fruitful arguments on details of some of the points in
the 13-Step Program might thereby be avoided.
Negotiations or Discussions?
Despite the new joint proposal from Russia and China on PAROS, the central sticking point on getting the CD
moving on issues related to nuclear arms control remains the disagreement on whether a new treaty is needed to
deal with outer space. There are three ways to meet in the middle on this. One is to reduce the scope of a
proposed PAROS treaty to make negotiations acceptable to the CD member states, while simultaneously
negotiating on the FMCT. Restricting the scope of the above-mentioned joint proposal to the region beyond
geosynchronous orbit for purposes of parallel PAROS and FMCT negotiations should avoid the principle
objections of the U.S. security apparatus and might thus eventually become acceptable to the U.S. government,
provided that this is sufficiently strongly supported by other CD members. A second approach is for China,
Russia, and others to agree to discussions only on PAROS during initial FMCT negotiations, perhaps in
exchange for some softening of U.S. insistence that it sees no need whatsoever for a new treaty dealing with
outer space. A third approach is to scale back both PAROS and the FMCT to ad hoc discussion committees.
This third option may be the most realistic. It at least provides some mechanism for looking at technical
aspects of above-mentioned issues connected with the FMCT. Moreover, it may evolve that actual entry into
force of an FMCT for the foreseeable future is in any case unrealistic. In this case all that may be achievable is
confidence building and transparency measures connected with broadening the scope of parallel declarations on
production halts to additional states that have not yet legally abjured nuclear weapons. For example, the
formation of a nuclear suppliers group restricting exchange of HEU naval reactor fuel and cores to as few as the
three countries presently using them could be helpful.11 If confidence building and transparency measures are all
that can realistically be achieved in the foreseeable future, then there is a question in any case whether formal
negotiations on a production cutoff treaty are really necessary.
The question of whether negotiations or discussions will occur in the CD on fissile materials production
and outer space may also have some impact on viable options for discussion of nuclear issues in an ad hoc
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committee on disarmament. If FMCT negotiations appear to be taken seriously, then many of the self-declared
non-nuclear-weapons states may be content with a nuclear disarmament discussion menu that deals with
individual issues without a serious head-on attack on the overall future of assembled nuclear explosives
holdings. If discussions only are to occur on fissile materials production and outer space, then some of these
states might be more prone to push for a broader based discussion on the retirement of what may become
broadly viewed as nuclear explosives holdings excess to needs defined by relations between nuclear weapons
states and others in the twenty-first century. In this case the declaration approach discussed above might yet be
of some utility.
Timing
It should be emphasized that the above discussion is focused primarily on what is needed to move the CD
beyond its present procedural impasse, rather than what is necessary to actually come to an agreement once this
occurs. In particular, the Chinese may need several years of discussions, productive interactions, and close
monitoring of U.S. ballistic missile defense activities and technology transfer before they will be comfortable
enough with U.S. intentions to accept limits on their own fissile material production.
Most critically, Pakistan will need to come to the conclusion that additional unsafeguarded fissile materials
production is not essential to its security before an agreement encompassing the poignant South Asian region
can be made. In early 2002 there was a confrontation, leading to threats of possible nuclear war, over India’s
complaints about Pakistan’s support for what India calls terrorism. What possible outcomes from this
confrontation would allow inclusion of South Asia in an enduring moratorium on production of fissile materials
for weapons programs? One is that India becomes convinced that the Pakistani political system is durably
capable of exercising adequate restraint in this area, and that Pakistan becomes convinced that further nuclear
weapons production is unnecessary. The second is that their recent confrontation with the possibility of nuclear
war convinces both countries that it does not matter how many nuclear weapons Pakistan has, as long as that
number does not decrease. A third is that Pakistan and India come to at least an implicit understanding of what
level of additional “minimum nuclear deterrence” is necessary, and that both countries can be induced to
cooperate on regional or global mechanisms to build confidence in a production halt once this occurs.
The approach taken by other states with nuclear weapons may also be critical with respect to Pakistan and
India. The cooperation of the United States and International Monetary Fund are essential to maintenance of the
shaky status quo in Pakistan. This provides considerable potential leverage, albeit with the potential of upsetting
the status quo in case of a major confrontation over nuclear policy. China’s relations with Pakistan and India are
also critical. Even if India achieves what it considers to be minimum nuclear deterrence, it may not cooperate
with confidence building or transparency measures if it feels China is a growing threat or is unduly supporting
growth of Pakistan’s nuclear potential even under safeguards. India also has a long-standing demand that the
permanent members of the United Nations Security Council engage it in serious discussions on the future of
nuclear disarmament. Thus India could possibly end up blocking action related to fissile materials production if
it is not satisfied with the nature of discussions on the future of nuclear disarmament.
There is also the possibility that the Middle East could provide a stumbling block even if other issues can
be worked out. In particular, even if Israel concludes it has adequate fissile material to halt its production for
weapons use, it is likely to continue to want to produce tritium to make up for radioactive decay of a material
needed to boost nuclear weapons yield. This could easily complicate the establishment of confidence building
or transparency measures in the Middle East, thereby requiring the politically trickier outcome of a regionally
tailored rather than globally uniform approach.
With these considerations in mind, what is a plausible minimal timing for traversing the path from Point A
(the current deadlock on FMCT negotiations) to Point B (a global moratorium on production of fissile materials
that are not safeguarded against use in nuclear weapons)? One answer is as follows:
• The Bush administration clarifies its immediate plans for missile defenses (e.g. during 2002–2004).
• A domestic U.S. political consensus (not unanimity) emerges that its missile defenses are not aimed at
neutralizing China’s modernizing strategic nuclear deterrent (e.g. from 2002–2005).
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• The United States develops a tacit understanding with China that U.S. missile defenses and Chinese
strategic nuclear delivery capabilities will be limited to prevent an open-ended arms race (e.g. during 2004
or 2005).
• The United States and China either agree to avoid a negotiating mandate for PAROS or limit it to mutually
acceptable issues (e.g. in 2004, 2005, or 2006).
• Influential Russian observers continue to agree that U.S. missile defenses that do not threaten China’s
intercontinental nuclear first strike capability also will not threaten the credibility of Russia’s second strike
capability.
• The domestic political situation in Pakistan and its relations with India are stable enough (e.g. during a long
enough period of time between 2005 and 2014) to allow eventual acceptance of asymmetric limits on fissile
materials holdings in South Asia and to avoid conflict with India severe enough to undermine India’s
acceptance of the same limits.
• Japan and any other key creditor and donor countries remain open enough to providing substantive
development aid to Pakistan in the context of a resolution of some key difficulties over nuclear weapons
programs in South Asia, even though neither Pakistan nor India adopts non-nuclear-weapons policies.
• Israel remains cooperative or low profile enough that an otherwise global fissile materials production
moratorium can evolve with Israel initially or subsequently joining it—with the level of transparency
allowed by Israel’s domestic and regional political circumstances.
• The fissile materials production programs of current non-nuclear-weapons NPT parties are constrained
enough that they do not promote continued production by another state.
Three recent developments have provided more room on either end for the possible timescale for
establishment of a broader moratorium on production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons programs. One is
the fallout from the infamous attacks of 11 September 2001. On the one hand, the United States now appears
more prepared to define China as a “strategic partner” rather than a “strategic competitor.” On the other hand
the “war on terrorism” can also provide a distraction from concentrating on the nuclear programs of the handful
of sovereign states that are currently producing fissile materials for weapons programs. The second
development is the early 2002 confrontation between India and Pakistan. Combined with changes in other
countries’ policies towards the region after September of 2001, this could precipitate a change of policies
leading to an earlier halt to production of fissile materials. Alternatively, the result could be a renewed
determination on the part of Pakistan to build more nuclear weapons, perhaps combined with supply and
funding difficulties that stretch out the time needed to accomplish this. The third development is intensified
conflict over the fate of Palestine. Weariness with this conflict and changed approaches by Israel’s neighbors
could lessen the focus on the importance of nuclear weapons and facilitate progress on global approaches to
fissile materials production. On the other hand, intense activity or simmering resentment over this conflict could
spill over to poison any approach to fissile materials production that requires the cooperation of Israel or its
neighbors.
How the United States and other influential countries view the likely implications of these developments
will heavily influence the outcome at the CD. If there is seen to be a reasonable expectation that a broader
fissile materials production cutoff may be forthcoming and contribute to security, then there will be more
motivation to overcome the obstacles to progress in the CD. If prospects for establishing a production cutoff
within the current decade seem very remote, then continued deadlock in the CD is likely.
The implications of such alternative futures for military and civilian nuclear programs, military nuclear
strategy, and the spillover into other arms control negotiations are potentially profound. A more thorough
understanding of the various factors influencing progress towards a global fissile weapons materials production
cut-off may help facilitate the process of choosing between such alternative futures.
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1. Comprehensive materials protection, control, and accounting (MPCA) in Russia is a critical component of
comprehensive global nuclear management. Allowing for inclusion of an additional 33 metric tons per year of Russian
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face a variety of political obstacles. For a discussion of progress on nuclear management in Russia, see Leonard Spector,
“Missing the Forest for the Trees: U.S. Non-Proliferation Programs in Russia,” Arms Control Today 31, no. 5 (June 2001):
6-11.
2. We use the usual definition of HEU as that containing more than 20 percent uranium-235. Weapons grade plutonium
is generally defined as that containing more than 20 percent of isotopes other than non-fissile plutonium-238, but there
seems little prospect that weapons grade plutonium will again be used as naval nuclear fuel. For related discussion, see
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3. See “Statement by Ambassador Eric M. Javits, United States Representative to the Conference on Disarmament,”
Geneva, 27 June 27 2002, at <http://www.usmission.ch/press2002/javits0627.htm>, accessed on 3 July 2002.
4. This paper draws heavily on results from public and private meetings in London, Paris, Beijing, Islamabad, New
Delhi, Geneva, and Washington in the spring of 2001. For details see Clifford Singer, editor, The New Nuclear Arms
Control Environment: Trip Report and Project Conclusions, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Program in Arms
Control, Disarmament, and International Security Occasional Paper, September 2001, at
<http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/homepage_docs/pubs_docs/PDF_Files/Singer%20Editor%20OP%20Folder/dreamweaver/cover
.html>, accessed on 5 July 2002.
5. See “International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation Press Release,” Berlin, 11 June 2002, at
<http://www.mbmd.org/PressReleases/berlin0602.html>, accessed on 3 July 2002.
6. See the “Statement by Ambassador Hu Xiaodi for Disarmament Affairs of China at the Plenary of the Conference on
Disarmament,” 7 June 2001, Geneva, at <http://www.mbmd.org/SpaceWeaponsBan/HuXiaodi.html>, accessed on 1 June
2002.
7. The existence of a letter on the uses of the space station for security purposes was pointed out by Wulf von Kries.
8. It has long been known that the energy cost of bringing extraterrestrial materials to earth orbit can be much lower
than lifting them into earth orbit from the ground. For an early detailed set of reports on this see Space Manufacturing III,
Proceedings of the Fourth Princeton/AIAA Conference, May 14–17, 1979, eds. Jerry Grey and Christine Krop, American
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics: New York (31 October 1979), including a report on “Collisional Orbital Change
of Asteroidal Materials” by C.E. Singer on pp. 556–559 of that volume. Given the copious and steady supply of solar energy
in space for separating hydrogen from oxygen to make high energy density rocket fuel, a cheaper extraterrestrial source of
water could eventually lead to a major expansion of military space operations dependent on resources obtained from well
beyond geosynchronous orbit. Scoping studies on this topic will be of little practical import, however, until there is
substantial additional experience with manned and unmanned operations in space of the type needed to execute such plans.
9. For a discussion of the 13–Step program, see Tariq Rauf, Towards NPT 2005: An Action Plan for the “13-Steps”
towards Nuclear Disarmament Agreed at NPT 2000, Monterey Institute of International Studies Center for Nonproliferation
Studies, <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/pdfs/npt2005.pdf>, accessed on 5 July 2002.
10. For a full draft of a “Declaration Concerning Nuclear Explosive Holdings,” and a discussion of the rationale behind
it, see Clifford Singer, “Look before You Leap: A Practicable Step towards Reduction and Possible Eventual Elimination of
Assembled Nuclear Explosives Holdings,” The Washington Quarterly 20 (summer 1998): 199–210;
<http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/homepage_docs/pubs_docs/PDF_Files/Look-Leap.pdf>, accessed on 5 July 2002.
11. For additional information on this topic, see James Clay Moltz, “Closing the Loophole on Exports of Naval
Propulsion Reactors,” The Nonproliferation Review 6 (fall 1998): 108–114.
